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In a practical CVQKD system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and
the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the
performance of the system. However, the performance of the optical attenuator may deteriorate due to the inten-
tional and unintentional damage of the device. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD
system with reduced optical attenuation. We find that the secret key rate of the system may be overestimated
based on the investigation of parameter estimation under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. This opens
a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical CVQKD system.
To close this loophole, we add an optical fuse at Alice’s output port and design a scheme to monitor the level
of optical attenuation in real time, which can make the secret key rate of the system evaluated precisely. The
analysis shows that these countermeasures can effectively resist this potential attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) technology has attracted widely attention due to
its unconditional security based on the guarantee of the basic
laws of quantum physics [1, 2]. It is a relatively mature tech-
nology to share symmetric keys between the authorized com-
munication parties Alice and Bob through an insecure quan-
tum channel that can be freely controlled and manipulated
by a potential eavesdroppers Eve [1–4]. At present, QKD
systems can be divided into the two broad classes: discrete-
variable quantum key distribution (DVQKD) and continuous-
variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). In comparison
with DVQKD systems, CVQKD systems using weak coherent
states and a homodyne detector can be well compatible with
the existing optical communication systems [4–8]. Therefore,
research of CVQKD has far-reaching significance.
In particular, CVQKD with the Gaussian-modulated coher-
ent states (GMCS) is the most favorable scheme, which has
been experimentally implemented by many research groups
in laboratories and in field environment [7, 9–12]. Here, we
also focus on the exploration of GMCS CVQKD schemes.
Although GMCS CVQKD schemes have been theoretically
proven to be secure against the collective and coherent at-
tacks [13, 14], there are some security loopholes that can be
used for hiding their attacks by Eve in practical experimen-
tations of such schemes, such as the local oscillator (LO)
fluctuation attack [15], the LO calibration attack [16], the
wavelength attack [17, 18], the saturation attack [19], finite
sampling bandwidth effects [20], homodyne detector blind-
∗Corresponding author: huang.peng@sjtu.edu.cn
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ing attack [21], jitter in clock synchronization [22], and the
polarization attack [23]. Subsequently, many corresponding
countermeasures have been proposed by researchers. To be
specific, in order to resist the attacks related to LO, a real-
time shot-noise measurement (RTSNM) scheme is proposed
by researchers [24, 25]. Recently, a local LO (LLO) CVQKD
scheme is designed and implemented experimentally, which
can fundamentally close the security loophole originates from
LO [26–30]. In addition, the proposed continuous-variable
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
(CV-MDI-QKD) schemes can completely eradicate all fatal
loopholes related to the detector [31, 32]. This history shows
that the discovery of security loopholes promotes study of
corresponding countermeasures, enhancing the practical se-
curity of CVQKD. Therefore, the explorations of the con-
cealed security loopholes are vital to the practical application
of CVQKD.
Optical attenuation is one of the key steps in the imple-
mentation of CVQKD schemes. However, the performance
of optical attenuators may deteriorate due to environmental
perturbations. For example, Eve can reduce its attenuation
level through laser damage attack [33, 34]. In particular, the
influences, which originate from the decrease of optical at-
tenuation, are ambiguous for the performance of a practical
CVQKD system. In this paper, we mainly investigate how
the decrease of optical attenuation affects the performance
of the system. More specifically, we first reveal the devia-
tion between the ideal states and the transmitted Gaussian-
modulated states affected by the reduced optical attenuation.
Then, we explore the quantum channel parameter estimation
under these effects based on the above analysis. Our results
show that the channel excess noise may be underestimated by
Alice and Bob under the effects of decreased optical attenu-
ation. Subsequently, the secret key rate is overestimated by
Alice and Bob, which is coincident with the security analysis
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2result of DVQKD under the effects of reduced optical attenu-
ation [35]. Thus, the decrease of optical attenuation may open
a security loophole for Eve to successfully hide her attacks,
such as the classical non-Gaussian attack, i.e., the intercept-
resend attack. To eliminate this loophole, we add an optical
fuse at Alice’s output port and design a real-time monitor-
ing scheme of the level of optical attenuation for a practical
CVQKD system. The analysis indicates that Alice and Bob
can precisely evaluate the channel parameters to accurately
calculate the secret key rate for a practical CVQKD system
through this scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, the ef-
fects of decreased optical attenuation are described and mod-
eled. Then, we analyse the parameter estimation of GMCS
CVQKD systems with reduced optical attenuation in Sec. III.
By considering the effects of reduced optical attenuation, in
Sec. IV, we evaluate the secret key rate against collective at-
tacks through theoretical calculation and simulation. To resist
the loophole induced by decreased optical attenuation, we add
an optical fuse at Alice’s output port and design a real-time
monitoring method for optical attenuation in Sec. V. Finally,
conclusions are presented in Sec. VI.
II. THE EFFECTS OF REDUCED OPTICAL
ATTENUATION
Optical attenuators can reduce the intensity of their input
optical signals to satisfy with the request of QKD systems.
In particular, variable optical attenuator (VOA) is one well-
known attenuator that can adjust the level of attenuation. The
level of attenuation is represented as
L = −10 lg Iout
Iin
, (1)
where Iin and Iout are the intensity of the input and output
optical signals in VOA, respectively. However, in practical
experimentation, the level of attenuation may not achieve the
excepted goal due to the effects of environmental perturba-
tions. For example, Eve may perform the laser damage attack
on VOA to reduce its attenuation level in a running DVQKD
system. Specifically, Eve can inject suitable light to the VOA
via quantum channel to deteriorate the performance of the at-
tenuator (see Fig. 1) [33, 34]. In particular, the VOA can
suffer catastrophic damage when the attack reaches a certain
power, which has been shown experimentally [33]. Fig. 1
also reflects the relationship between the intensity of the out-
put and input optical signal in VOA under the effects of the
laser damage attack based on the Eq.(1). Obviously, the in-
tensity of the output optical signal for the attacked VOA is
greater than its ideal value.
Optical attenuator is also a key device for the implemen-
tation of a CVQKD system. Similarly, VOA has been widely
used in the CVQKD systems. In particular, VOA is used in the
transmitter of a practical CVQKD system (see Fig. 2), which
can attenuate the intensity of the Gaussian-modulated optical
signal A to quantum level for guaranteeing the unconditional
security of the system based on the basic laws of quantum
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FIG. 1: The performance of VOA under the laser damage attack. Part
(a) describes the schematic of the laser damage attack. Part (b) shows
the relation between the attenuation level of VOA and the attacking
power. CW Laser, continuous-wave laser; I ′out, the intensity of the
output optical signal with reduced attenuation.
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FIG. 2: The transmitter of a general practical CVQKD system. AM,
amplitude modulator; PM, phase modulator; BS, beam splitter; PBS,
polarizing beam splitter; FM, faraday mirror; DL, delay line; LO,
local oscillator.
physics [4, 6, 8, 14]. It is notable that the attenuation level of
VOA in the CVQKD systems can be also decreased by Eve
through laser damage attack. Here, after attenuation, we use
A0 andA′0 to represent the ideal quantum signal and imperfect
quantum signal, respectively.
More specifically, in a Gaussian-modulated scenario, Alice
generates a series of Gaussian-modulated coherent states |αA〉
based on the key information [4]. In the phase space, |αA〉 can
be expressed as
|αA〉 = |αA|eiθ = xA + ipA,
xA = |αA| cos θ, pA = |αA| sin θ,
(2)
where |αA| and θ respectively indicate the amplitude and
phase of the Gaussian-modulated optical signal A, xA and
pA are two independent quadratures variables with identical
variance VA and zero mean [4, 6]. Moreover, the intensity IA
and amplitude |αA| of the optical signal A obey the following
relation:
IA ∝ |αA|2 (3)
3Therefore, Alice can adjust the values of xA and pA to the ap-
propriate values xA0 and pA0 by VOA. Here, xA0 and pA0 are
two quadratures variables of the ideal quantum optical signal
A0. Correspondingly, |αA0〉 = xA0 + ipA0 is the transmitted
Gaussian-modulated coherent states. In addition, the variance
VA of the quadratures variables xA or pA in terms of the mean
photon number of optical signal A reads [36]
VA = 2〈n〉. (4)
Equally, the variance VA can also be attenuated to the preset
value VA0 by Alice through VOA in a practical CVQKD sys-
tem.
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FIG. 3: The expression of the transmitted Gaussian-modulated co-
herent states in the phase space under the effects of reduced optical
attenuation.
However, xA0 , pA0 and VA0 may deviate from the ideal val-
ues due to the effects of reduced optical attenuation, which is
revealed in Fig. 3 based on the phase space. In the following
analysis, we assume that I ′out and Iout satisfy with the follow-
ing relation:
I ′out = kIout(k > 1). (5)
Correspondingly, according to the above analysis, the changes
of xA0 , pA0 and VA0 are as follows:
x′A0 =
√
kxA0 , p
′
A0 =
√
kpA0 ,
V ′A0 = kVA0 ,
(6)
where x′A0 and p
′
A0
are two independent quadratures variables
of imperfect quantum signal A′0, V
′
A0
are the variance of x′A0
or p′A0 .
Apart from these, the intensity of LO signal needs to be
adjusted to an optimal value by VOA to optimize the perfor-
mance of a practical CVQKD system. There is no doubt that
the intensity of LO signal can deviate from the optimal value
under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. In practice,
however, the effects of decreased optical attenuation on the
LO signal can be completely eliminated through the real-time
shot-noise measurement technique. The basic principle of the
technique is illustrated in the Fig. 4. Specifically, Bob first
splits a fraction of LO signal to a balanced homodyne detector.
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FIG. 4: The scheme of the real-time shot-noise measurement in the
receiver of a general practical CVQKD system. Hom, homodyne
detector.
Further, the variance of shot-noise can be evaluated through
the interference between the separated LO signal and the vac-
uum mode. In addition, according to the calibrated linear re-
lation between the variance of shot-noise and the intensity of
LO signal, the variance can be also evaluated by monitoring
the intensity of the LO signal in real time. Accordingly, we
will focus on the investigation of the effects of reduced opti-
cal attenuation on signal states, i.e., the Gaussian-modulated
coherent states, in the following analysis.
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION UNDER THE EFFECTS
OF REDUCED OPTICAL ATTENUATION
The key distribution process of the one-way GMCS
CVQKD systems can be described by the standard prepare-
and-measure (PM) model. However, in practical implementa-
tion of CVQKD schemes, the evaluation of the secret key rate
is accomplished based on the equivalent entanglement-based
(EB) scheme. The sender Alice first prepares one two-mode
squeezed (EPR) state with variance V = VA0 + 1. Subse-
quently, the mode A is measured by a heterodyne detector,
and the modA0 is sent to the the receiver Bob through a quan-
tum channel with transmissivity T and excess noise ε. Then,
Bob exploits a homodyne detector with efficiency η and noise
νel to measure the quadratures xB or pB of his received mode
B2 (see Fig. 5) [8]. In addition, the homodyne detector inef-
ficiency is modelled by a beam splitter. Finally, it is essential
to perform classical post-processing which includes sifting,
parameter estimation, key reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation [6, 8, 37, 38]. In particular, parameter estimation is a
key step which determines the secret key rate and the maximal
transmission distance for a practical CVQKD system.
After transmission and detection of the quantum coherent
states, Alice and Bob share a group correlated vectors X =
{(xA0i , xBi)|i = 1, 2, . . . , N} or P = {(pA0i , pBi)|i =
1, 2, . . . , N}. Here, N is the total number of the received
pulses. The involved quantum channel for GMCS CVQKD
systems is assumed to be a normal linear model which satis-
fies the following relation between Alice and Bob:
xB = txA0 + z, (7)
where t =
√
ηt, vector z is the total noises term following a
4XA
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FIG. 5: The EB model of the one-way GMCS CVQKD protocols us-
ing homodyne detector. The quantum channel parameters, i.e., trans-
mission T and excess noise ε, which can be freely controlled and
manipulated by Eve.
centered normal distribution with variance σ2 = ηTξ+N0 +
Vel. Here, the related parameter η is detection efficiency of the
homodyne detector, Vel is electronic noise of the homodyne
detector, N0 is the variance of shot-noise. Accordingly, xA0
and xB meet the following relations:
〈x2A0〉 = VXA0 , 〈xA0xB〉 =
√
ηTVXA0 ,
〈x2B〉 = ηTVXA0 + ηTξ +N0 + Vel.
(8)
There is no doubt that pA0 and pB also satisfy Eqs. (7) and (8).
Moreover, in the evaluation of the secret key rate, the above
parameters VXA0 , ξ and Vel must be described by VA0N0, εN0
and νelN0, respectively.
In practical experimentation, Alice and Bob randomly ex-
tract m(m < N) pairs data from X or P vectors to estimate
the parameters T and ξ. The maximum-likelihood estimators
tˆ and σˆ2 are known with the normal linear model [13, 39],
which are
tˆ =
∑m
i=1 xA0ixBi∑m
i=1 x
2
A0i
, σˆ2 =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(xBi − tˆx2A0 i). (9)
Here, parameters tˆ and σˆ2 are independent estimators which
obey the distributions
tˆ ∼ N
(
t,
σ2∑m
i=1 x
2
A0 i
)
,
mσˆ2
σ2
∼ χ2(m− 1), (10)
where t and σ2 are the true values of these parameters. The
χ2 distribution converges to a normal distribution under the
condition that m is large enough (e.g., m > 106). Therefore,
the confidence intervals for the estimators tˆ and σˆ2 are
t ∈ [tˆ−∆t, tˆ+ ∆t], σ2 ∈ [σˆ2 −∆σ2, σˆ2 + ∆σ2]. (11)
Here,
∆t = zPE/2
√
σˆ2
mVXA0
,∆σ2 = zPE/2
σˆ2
√
2√
m
, (12)
where PE is a probability that the estimated parameter does
not belong to the confidence region, zPE/2 is a coefficient fol-
lowing 1 − 12erf(zPE/2/
√
2) = 12PE, and erf(·) is the error
function defined as erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. Making use of
the previous estimators, the quantum channel parameters, i.e.,
the transmission T and excess noise ε, can be estimated by
T =
tˆ2
η
, ε =
σˆ2 −N0 − νelN0
N0tˆ2
. (13)
According to the analysis in Sec. II, the transmitted
Gaussian-modulated coherent states under the effects of re-
duced optical attenuation are different from the ideal states
with perfect optical attenuation for a practical CVQKD sys-
tem. It should be noted that x′A0 and x
′
B also satisfy with
Eqs. (7) and (8), i.e., x′B = tx
′
A0
+ z, 〈(x′A0)2〉 =
V ′XA0 , 〈x
′
A0
x′B〉 =
√
ηTV ′XA0 , 〈(x
′
B)
2〉 = ηTV ′XA0 + ηTξ +
N0 + Vel. Here, V ′XA0 = V
′
A0
N0, x′B is the practical value
detected by Bob under the effects of imperfect optical attenu-
ation.
However, Alice and Bob still use xA0 to estimate parame-
ters for a CVQKD system with reduced attenuation under the
condition that they do not aware the shifting of the attenua-
tion level of VOA. Therefore, the relations between vectors
kept by Alice and Bob become
〈x2A0〉 = VXA0 , 〈xA0x′B〉 =
√
kηTVXA0 ,
〈(x′B)2〉 = kηTVXA0 + ηTξ +N0 + Vel.
(14)
Finally, based on Eqs. (8) and (14), we get√
ηT ′VXA0 =
√
kηTVXA0 ,
ηT ′VXA0 + ηT
′ξ′ +N0 + Vel = kηTVXA0
+ ηTξ +N0 + Vel.
(15)
Solving these equations yields
T ′ = kT, ξ′ =
ξ
k
. (16)
Expressed in shot-noise unit, the estimated excess noise be-
come
ε′ =
ε
k
(k > 1). (17)
Fig. 6 shows the estimated excess noise as a function of k
under ε = 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, respectively. It is clearly that the
channel excess noises are underestimated under the effects of
reduced optical attenuation. We find that with the increment of
the value of k, the estimated values of various channel excess
noises will decrease. When the attenuation level deteriorates
to a certain extent, the excess noise estimated by Alice and
Bob may be close to zero. These analysis results indicate that
the reduced optical attenuation may create a condition for Eve
to conceal her attacks in a practical CVQKD system. Next,
we use the classical partial intercept-resend (PIR) attack as an
example to analyse the security of a practical CVQKD system
under the effects of reduced optical attenuation.
In the PIR attack, the probability distribution of Bob’s
measurements is weighted sum of two Gaussian distributions
[16, 40]. The first one is the distribution of the intercepted
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FIG. 6: The estimated excess noise as a function of k under different
channel excess noise. Curves from top to bottom represent ε = 0.05,
ε = 0.03, ε = 0.01.
resend data with a weight of u, and the other one is the distri-
bution of the transmitted data with a weight of 1− u. Further,
the extra excess noise induced by the PIR attack is expressed
by 2uN0. In theory, the excess noise estimated by Alice and
Bob under the effects of the PIR attack should be written as
ξPIR = ξt + 2uN0, (18)
where ξt = εtN0 is the technical excess noise of the system.
Expressed in shot-noise, the estimated excess noise ξPIR can
be computed as
εPIR = εt + 2u. (19)
Here, we use u = 0.2 as an example to analyse the PIR at-
tack in general situation. Correspondingly, the estimated ex-
cess noise become εt + 0.4. In this case, the estimated excess
noise under the effects of reduced optical attenuation should
be calculated as
ε′PIR =
εt + 0.4
k
. (20)
In a practical CVQKD system, we assume that the technical
excess noise is a typical value, i.e., εt = 0.1. Therefore, when
Eve executes the PIR attack, the estimated excess noise under
the effects of reduced optical attenuation can be calculated as
ε′PIR =
0.5
k . In the case of perfect optical attenuation, the
noise value is 0.5. The obvious increase of the excess noise
makes the potential attack exposed. Hence, denial-of-service
can occur to guarantee the security of the system. However,
we find that Eve can exploit the effects of decreased optical
attenuation to reduce the estimated excess noise. For exam-
ple, when k = 5, the estimated excess noise ε′PIR = 0.1, i.e.,
the ideal noise value without attack. Here, based on Eqs. (1)
and (5), Eve can reduce the attenuation level of the VOA by
10 lg 5 ≈ 7dB to satisfy with k = 5. These analysis results
fully demonstrate that the excess noise induced by the PIR at-
tack can be completely hidden with the help of reduced optical
attenuation. In particular, a full intercept-resend (FIR) attack
can be implemented when u = 1. Correspondingly, the excess
noise estimated by Alice and Bob under the effects of reduced
optical attenuation should be expressed as εFIR = 2.1k . In this
case, when k exceeds 21, the strongest FIR attack can be com-
pletely hidden by Eve. Therefore, the decreased optical atten-
uation will open a loophole for Eve to hide her attacks, which
seriously destroys the security of the practical system.
IV. SECRET KEY RATE AGAINST COLLECTIVE
ATTACKS UNDER THE EFFECTS OF REDUCED OPTICAL
ATTENUATION
The secret key rate and the maximal transmission distance
are the key standards for the performance evaluation of a prac-
tical CVQKD system. Based on the parameters VA0 , T , ε, η
and νel, Alice and Bob can calculate the information shared
by them, as well as the maximal bound on the information
available to eavesdropper. In the case of reverse reconcilia-
tion, the secret key rate K with n received pulses used for key
establishment against collective attacks is expressed as [8, 39]
K =
n
N
[βIAB − SPEBE −∆ (n)], (21)
where n = N −m, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the reconciliation effi-
ciency. SPEBE represents the maximal value of the Holevo infor-
mation compatible with the statistics except with probability
PE, and IAB represents the shannon mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob, which can be derived from Bob’s mea-
sured variance VB and the conditional variance VB|A0 as
IAB =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|A0
=
1
2
log2
VA0 + 1 + χtot
1 + χtot
. (22)
Here, χtot = χline + χhom/T represents the total noise re-
ferred to the channel input, where χline = 1/T − 1 + ε, and
χhom = [(1− η) + νel]/η. In particular, SPEBE is determined by
the following covariance matrix between Alice and Bob with
finite-size effect:
ΓAB = (VA0 + 1) I √Tmin (V 2A0 + 2VA0)σz√
Tmin
(
V 2A0 + 2VA0
)
σz [Tmin (VA0 + εmax) + 1] I
 ,
(23)
where matrices I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, Tmin and
εmax correspond the lower bound of T and the upper bound
of ε, respectively. According to Ref. [39], when m is large
enough (e.g., m > 106), Tmin and εmax can be calculated by
using
Tmin =
(tˆ−∆t)2
η
,
εmax =
σˆ2 + ∆σ2 −N0 − νelN0
tˆ2N0
,
(24)
6where ∆t and ∆σ2 are defined in Eq. (12). Then, SPEBE can be
acquired by
SPEBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
, (25)
where G (x) = (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1) − xlog2x, λi ≥ 1
are sympletic eigenvalues derived from covariance matrices,
which can be written as
λ21,2 =
1
2
(A±
√
A2 − 4B),
λ23,4 =
1
2
(C ±
√
C2 − 4D),
λ5 =1,
(26)
where
A = (VA0 + 1)
2 − 2Tmin(V 2A0 + 2VA0)
+ [Tmin(VA0 + εmax) + 1]
2,
B = [(Tminεmax + 1)(VA0 + 1)− TminVA0 ]2,
C =
Aχhom + (VA0 + 1)
√
B + Tmin(VA0 + εmax) + 1
ηTmin(VA0 + εmax) + 1 + νel
,
D =
√
B(VA0 + 1) +Bχhom
ηTmin(VA0 + εmax) + 1 + νel
.
(27)
Moreover, ∆ (n) is a linear function of n in Eq. (21), which
is related to the security of the privacy amplification. In a
practical CVQKD system, it can be given by [39]
∆ (n) = 7
√
log2 (1/)
n
+
2
n
log2
1
PA
, (28)
where  and PA, which are virtual parameters and can be op-
timized in the computation, denote the smoothing parameter
and the failure probability of the privacy amplification, respec-
tively. In addition,  and PA are usually set to be equal to PE
due to the value of ∆(n) mainly depends on n.
Based on the above equations, Alice and Bob can calcu-
late the secret key rate with finite-size effect against collec-
tive attacks for the system. Therefore, the secret key rate
can be regarded as a function of the above parameters, i.e.,
K = K(VA0 , T, ε, νel). According to the analysis in Sec. III,
the estimated quantum channel parameters under reduced op-
tical attenuation are different from their true values. In ad-
dition, the variation of VA0 can also not be detected by Al-
ice and Bob when the modulation variance is not be moni-
tored in a practical CVQKD system. Accordingly, the eval-
uated secret key rate for a CVQKD system with decreased
optical attenuation is expressed as Ke = K(VA0 , T
′, ε′, νel).
However, the practical secret key rate should be calculated as
Kp = K(V
′
A0
, T, ε, νel). In order to clearly reveal the dif-
ference between the evaluated secret key rate and the prac-
tical secret key rate for a practical CVQKD system with re-
duced optical attenuation, we simulate the secret key rate ver-
sus transmission distance under different excess noise ε.
Fig. 7 depicts the relationship between the secret key rate
and the transmission distance for a practical CVQKD sys-
tem under the effects of different deterioration situations when
ε = 0.01, 0.05. The fixed parameters for the simulation are set
as: VA0 = 4, η = 0.5, νel = 0.01, β = 95%,  = 10
−10,m =
0.5 × N , respectively. It is obvious that the secret key rate
Ke evaluated by Alice and Bob under the effects of reduced
optical attenuation is overestimated compared with their prac-
tical value Kp. The simulation results also demonstrate that
the decreased optical attenuation can open a security loophole
for Eve to perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical
CVQKD system.
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FIG. 7: Secret key rate vs transmission distance for different dete-
rioration situations when ε = 0.01, 0.05, respectively. Unlabeled
curves from top to bottom represent the relations between the evalu-
ated secret key rate Ke and the transmission distance under different
imperfect attenuation situations. Labeled curves from top to bottom
show the corresponding practical secret key rate Kp vs transmission
distance under different deterioration situations. The fiber loss is 0.2
dB/km.
In particular, the difference between the estimated secret
key rate under reduced optical attenuation and the practical
secret key rate in the same situation reflects the key informa-
tion that can be acquired by Eve through the intercept-resend
attack. We find that the leaking of the secret key information
increases with the decrease of optical attenuation. In addition,
the simulation results also indicate that Eve can acquire more
secret key information in the case of a larger excess noise ε
under the effects of the same amount of decrease of optical
attenuation.
More importantly, the defense of the attack is a key task.
We observe that the changes of the modulation variance of the
system and the attenuation level of VOA are synchronous in a
practical CVQKD system. Therefore, the real-time monitor-
ing of the modulation variance of the system might close this
loophole, which is investigated in detail in next section.
7V. COUNTERMEASURES
The above investigations show that the influences of re-
duced optical attenuation effect on the estimated parameters
procedures and the evaluated secret key rate. To remove the
loophole induced by reduced optical attenuation, we here add
an isolator at Alice’s output port to resist the potential laser
damage attack. More specifically, we first bound the power
of Eve’s injected light to a reasonable based on the method in
Ref. [41], and then choose an appropriate isolator for the sys-
tem. However, it might be possible that Eve is able to decrease
the performance of the isolator by using the laser damage at-
tack. Therefore, the isolation value should be monitored in
real time. In order to reduce costs and improve efficiency, we
can replace the isolator with an optical fuse. The optical fuse
can only tolerate a certain amount of laser power but discon-
nects itself once the power crosses a threshold. In this way, the
optical fuse physically blocks the injected high power, which
effectively protects the system from the laser damage attack.
Apart from the laser damage attack, the attenuation value
may decrease due to the effects of the rising of environment
temperature. Accordingly, we propose a real-time monitor-
ing scheme for the level of optical attenuation to prevent the
incorrect estimation of channel parameters. According to the
analysis of Section. II, we find that the performance of the op-
tical attenuator can be evaluated by monitoring the real-time
variation of the modulation variance before the transmission
of quantum signal.
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FIG. 8: The structure of the real-time monitoring scheme for the level
of optical attenuation in Alice’s apparatus.
Fig. 8 shows the procedure of the real-time monitor-
ing scheme of the level of optical attenuation for a practi-
cal CVQKD system in Alice’s apparatus. Specifically, Alice
first splits a fraction of the attenuated quantum signal and the
undamped LO signal. Then, Alice can get a sample U af-
ter the interference between the separated quantum signal and
LO signal in a homodyne detector. The detection module has
been described in Fig. 4. In the sample, all data are the sam-
pled voltage values. Then, the variance of these data can be
counted as
var(U) = 〈U2〉 − 〈U〉2
=
1
Nu
Nu∑
i=1
U2i − (
1
Nu
Nu∑
i=1
Ui)
2,
(29)
where Nu is the size of the sample, Ui is the ith data in the
sample. Since the sample is finite, the value of var(U) should
be modified as
var′(U) = var(U) + zPE/2
var(U)
√
2√
Nu
. (30)
Subsequently, the measured variance of the quadrature vari-
ables xA0 or pA0 of the separated quantum signal can be cal-
culated as [36]
Vm = 〈x2A0〉m = 〈p2A0〉m =
var′(U)
PLOρ2g2Bhf
, (31)
where PLO is the power of the separated local oscillator, ρ is
the PIN diode’s responsivity, g is the total amplification of the
homodyne detector, B is electronic bandwidth, h is Planck’s
constant, f is optical frequency. Because these parameters
are some constant values, Alice can analyse the variation of
the modulation variance through the sample U . Further, the
practical variance of the quadrature variables XA0 or PA0 can
be calculated as
Vp = V
′
A0 =
Vm −N0 − νelN0
N0
. (32)
Therefore, k can be acquired in real time by analysing the dif-
ference between Vp and the preset modulation variance VA0 ,
i.e., k =
V ′A0
VA0
=
Vp
VA0
. Finally, Alice and Bob can utilize the
acquired Vp and k to precisely evaluate the secret key rate of
the system, i.e.,Km = K(Vp, T
′
k , kε
′, νel) = Kp. These anal-
ysis results fully indicate that the real-time monitoring scheme
can effectively resist the loophole induced by reduced optical
attenuation.
Importantly, in the proposed scheme, the homodyne detec-
tor and the separated LO signal may be controlled by Eve.
Fortunately, the countermeasures against the attacks related to
LO and homodyne detector has been designed well in Refs
.[16, 19–21]. Based on these corresponding countermeasures,
the proposed monitoring scheme is immune to Eve. In addi-
tion, the monitoring module may reduce the performance of
the system, and add the complexity of the implementation of
the system. However, it is notable that the influences of the
losses of the Gaussian-modulated signal and LO signal can be
completely eliminated by properly adjusting the preset value
of the attenuation level of VOA in a practical CVQKD system.
Through the combination of the above countermeasures,
the modulation variance of the system can be precisely eval-
uated in real time. Eventually, the secret key rate of the
CVQKD systems with reduced optical attenuation can be pre-
cisely evaluated to effectively remove this security loophole
with the help of these schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the impacts of reduced optical attenu-
ation for a practical CVQKD system. We reveal that the trans-
mitted Gaussian-modulated coherent states will deviate from
the preset values under the effects of decreased optical attenu-
ation. Further, we find that the estimated channel excess noise
8is smaller than the practical value under the influences of re-
duced optical attenuation. This effect makes the secret key
rate of the system overestimated, which can open a security
loophole for Eve to successfully perform the intercept-resend
attack in a practical CVQKD system. We show that Eve can
obtain more key information for the case of a larger channel
excess noise in the same amount of decrease of optical atten-
uation. Eve also can obtain more key information by reducing
the attenuation value further. In order to close the loophole
induced by reduced optical attenuation, we first add an optical
fuse at Alice’s output port and then propose a real-time mon-
itoring scheme for the attenuation level of VOA in a practical
CVQKD system by analysing the variation of the variance of
the quadrature variables XA0 or PA0 of the attenuated quan-
tum signal before send to Bob. These countermeasures can
make Alice and Bob precisely evaluate the channel param-
eters to accurately analyse the performance of the CVQKD
systems with reduced optical attenuation.
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